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Disclosure Regimes and Corporate Governance 
 
by 
 
JENS WÜSTEMANN 
 
 
1   Introduction 
 
This paper analyzes some aspects of the relationship of variant international 
disclosure regimes and corporate governance. In considering informational 
aspects of corporate governance from an institutional perspective, I follow the 
definition of corporate governance set out by SHLEIFER AND VISHNY [1997, p. 
737], who define corporate governance as “the ways suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return of their investment”.1 The 
various ways for a supplier of finance to ensure getting an appropriate return 
include, e.g., decision rights, control rights, protection rights, payout rights, and 
monitoring rights, some of which naturally might overlap. 
However, to exercise control and to ― actively or passively ― monitor 
management effectively, financial contracting parties also need value-relevant 
information to base their individual decisions upon. The allocation of information 
rights directly affects the exertion of control and therefore, ultimately, the 
distribution of future payouts for investors. Information rights and the flow of 
information within the firm and to outside parties consequently constitute 
important elements of corporate governance. A comparative institutional 
assessment of disclosure regimes shows that internationally these rights to obtain 
information are allocated in different modes. I argue that this varying distribution 
of information rights can be interpreted as a function of different ― but probably 
somewhat consistent ― systems of corporate governance in national financial 
systems. 
I understand the term “disclosure regime” in a broad sense. A disclosure 
regime encompasses all legally recognized information claims a system of 
corporate governance or a financial system furnishes financial contracting parties 
with. This includes private information channels (see LEUZ AND WÜSTEMANN 
[2003]). An information claim is an enforceable legitimate information interest. 
Typically, investors’ information interests lie in the financial consequences of 
realized or planed dispositions of firm’s management. The disclosure regime 
comprises public disclosure, induced, say, by securities regulation, but it also 
includes disclosure duties of management towards outside directors (or the 
supervisory board in a two-tiers system), and information rights of banks (see 
HOMMELHOFF [2000]). Traditional instruments of financial accounting such as 
                                                 
1  See SCHMIDT [1997], TIROLE [2001], and ZINGALES [1998] for wider definitions. 
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accounting numbers constitute but a part of a disclosure regime.2 In restricting the 
set of decision-relevant information, disclosure regimes also restrict the set of 
means that enable protection of interests of the financial contracting parties. 
In comparing international institutional designs from a contractual perspective, 
the agenda of the New Institutional Economics has proven to be fruitful:3 It has 
always been the agenda of this school to study „contracting in its entirety“ 
(WILLIAMSON [1984, p. 210]); New Institutional Economics is strongly influenced 
by the notion of the firm as a “nexus of contracts” (JENSEN and MECKLING [1976, 
p. 310]; see also, e. g., SCHANZE [2003]). In a world of incomplete contracts, 
however, underlying “constitutions” become important (see also, e. g., 
EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL [1991]). KIRCHNER [1997] argues that accounting 
regulation or securities regulation can be interpreted as underlying constitutions 
which form an implicit part of a financial contract. Accounting regulation defines 
the basic set of important financial key numbers the parties can contract on, for 
instance for pay-out restrictions. Similarly, securities regulation defines the set of 
publicly available information for actual or potential suppliers of finance to public 
corporations. Disclosure regimes are in a certain sense thus embedded in 
corporate governance. Disclosure duties imposed on a firm by, for instance, 
banking acts (see infra) probably don’t belong to corporate governance in a 
narrow sense. But they nevertheless influence the degree of informational 
asymmetries between financial contracting parties and the firm and thus affect the 
way investors “assure themselves of getting a return of their investment” (see 
supra). The nexus of information rights formed by accounting and disclosure 
regulation is therefore crucial to determine “power” in the firm. Alternatively, 
national disclosure regimes can be explained by existent distribution of power to 
key contracting parties.4  
Within the framework of the New Institutional Economics, disclosure also 
serves as an important means of measurement. With regard to product markets, 
BARZEL [1982] argues that brand names reduce measurement costs and interprets 
brand names as ways of rational suppression of information. Under certain 
conditions, therefore, it is “expected that some readily obtainable information will 
be suppressed to preempt opportunities for excessive measurement” (FURUBOTN 
and RICHTER [1997, p. 293]). This should be valid for the organization of financial 
markets, too: Internationally accepted sets of accounting and auditing standards 
may equally reduce measurement costs of the quality of securities. 
The following section sketches the paradigm of externalization of value-re-
levant information in a system of outsider control and stresses the role of 
complementary institutions. Section 3 outlines some differences in a model in 
which investors with privileged information represent key contracting parties and 
exercise control. Section 4 briefly emphasizes the need of detailed and appropriate 
                                                 
2  Similarily, the term “financial reporting” accentuates the need of soft information 
and continous information as supplementary means of investor information (BEAVER 
[1989/1998]). 
3  See, e.g., FURUBOTN AND RICHTER [1997] for an assessment of the New 
Institutional Economics. 
4  See for some discussions FURUBOTN AND RICHTER [1997, pp. 292ff]. 
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disclosure rules both within the firm and towards markets. Finally, section 5 
points out that realistic assessment of control regimes and recommendations for 
institutional design also need to encompass behavioral aspects of decision making. 
I argue that from a behavioral law and economics standpoint under certain 
circumstances incentives to disclose information to monitoring parties may fail 
due to irrational evaluation and response to risk. Thus, in addition to meaningful 
disclosure systems, corporate governance should also take into account some 
more convincing assumptions of the processing of value-relevant information both 
within the firm and towards markets. 
 
 
2   Externalization of Information and Outsider Control 
 
In the mid-19th century, corporations of the modern type began to evolve in the 
U.S. and to influence economic development of the national economy 
significantly (see CHANDLER [1990]). In 1932, Berle and Means made, so to 
speak, a historical observation when they stated in their seminal book that the 
modern corporation was characterized by dispersed ownership and that in contrast 
to family-dominated traditional corporations’ management by then didn’t possess 
significant parts of the shares. They concluded famously that “separation of 
ownership from control produces a condition where the interest of owner and of 
ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge” (BERLE AND MEANS [1932, p. 6]; 
see also SMITH [1776/1991], BLAIR [1995]). In a stylized way, the U.S. financial 
system is until today the prototype of a market-oriented financial system:5 A large 
number of corporations is listed and publicly traded, households and financial 
institutions keep shares directly. Corporations are financed at arm’s length. The 
typical ownership structure is characterized by dispersed ownership and no 
substantial cross-holdings (LA PORTA et al. [1999]). Equity capital plays a 
relatively more important role than debt capital. This system of monitoring 
structures is sometimes referred to as a system of outsider control. 
In consequence, corporate governance in the U.S. primarily “refers to the 
defense of shareholders’ interest” (TIROLE [2001, p. 1]). “Creating shareholder 
value” (RAPPAPORT [1998]) was, so to speak, always the prevailing business 
strategy. Extensive direct protection rights of minority shareholders belong to the 
important means of defense of shareholder interests. But public dissemination of 
information also plays a crucial role in the U.S. ever since the enactments of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In a well-known 
remark Justice Brandeis stated even as early as 1914 that „[p]ublicity is justly 
commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be 
the best of disinfectants“. U.S. securities regulation rests on a philosophy of full 
and fair disclosure.6 In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson (U.S. 224, 234) the Supreme Court 
emphasized that Congress had adopted a policy of „disclosure, and not 
paternalistic withholding of accurate information“. For a typical Berle-Means-
                                                 
5  See FRANKS AND MAYER [1994], BERGLÖF [1997]; see also ALLEN AND GALE 
[2001]. 
6  See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988). 
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corporation the philosophy of full and fair disclosure serves to reduce agency 
costs that arise out of the separation of ownership and control. The protection by 
means of externalization of information works at least threefold: The individual 
investor is protected from misleading statements and from the omission of 
material facts by a corporation. In semi-efficient capital markets individual 
investors are also protected by (fair) market prices of shares which reflect all 
publicly available information and which may replace individual evaluation of 
decision-relevant information. Finally, the wide public dissemination of value-
relevant information enables an active market for corporate control which 
probably constitutes the core of the monitoring structure of an outside-control 
regime (takeovers, proxy fights, and leveraged buy-outs). However, it would be 
naïve to overinterpret the notion of “full” disclosure. In fact, informational 
asymmetries between management (insiders) and the market (outsiders) will 
remain in spite of detailed public disclosure. Also, the line between imposed 
disclosure duties and information not required to be disclosed is fuzzy even in 
U.S. securities regulation (LOSS AND SELIGMAN [2001]). 
Recent research has emphasized the complementary function of the overall 
institutional infrastructure (BALL [2001]) and the role of enforcement institutions 
and market-oriented incentive structures such as class actions for functioning 
equity markets (e. g., WÜSTEMANN [2002]). The different institutional analyses 
show equally that efficient securities markets are the result of a variety of 
institutional mechanisms and that the “magic” of strong securities markets “does 
not appear in unregulated markets“ (BLACK [2001, p. 782]). This insight is of 
importance for economies that intend to shift towards a market-oriented financial 
system, such as some countries of the E.U., including Germany (see also SCHMIDT 
AND TYRELL [1997]). 
In summary, the modus of externalization of information with its emphasis on 
public disclosure and complementary infrastructure can be interpreted as an 
institutional solution to corresponding agency and monitoring problems in modes 
of corporate governance attached to typical financing patterns of a market-
oriented financial system. The institutional infrastructures guarantee that key 
contracting financial parties are well-informed (and well protected).7 Interestingly, 
important ways of monitoring (by the market for corporate control) are exercised 
by means of market regulation (securities regulation) and less by means of 
corporate governance (corporation law). 
 
 
3   Internalization of Information and Insider Control 
 
Even for large multinational corporations the financing patterns of the type just 
mentioned are not equally valid on an international scale (LAPORTA et al. [1999]; 
PRIGGE [1998]). In contrast to the market-oriented financial system of the U.S., 
the German financial system, for instance, traditionally has been characterized by 
a domination of banks (see also SCHMIDT AND TYRELL [1997]): The direct raising 
of capital using the capital market is of minor importance. Rather, long term 
                                                 
7  See LEUZ AND WÜSTEMANN [2003] for details and discussion. 
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financing by house banks ― in the sense of relationship lending ― is the most 
important source of capital. The financial system is characterized by cross-
holdings and a heavy concentration of ownership (families, banks, and insurance 
companies). 
Not surprisingly, a different control structure has developed historically, which 
sometimes is referred to as a regime of “insider control” (FRANKS AND MAYER 
[1994], BERGLÖF [1997]) or, with regard to the different role of banks and 
intermediated financing in general, as “informed capital” (TIROLE [2001, p. 8]). 
Insider control means that a smaller group of better informed parties 
(representatives of families, banks, and insurance companies) exercises significant 
control of management, for instance by means of membership in the supervisory 
board. The concentrated ownership at least prevents some monitoring problems 
typically attached to the Berle-Means-corporation with its dispersed ownership 
structure (and leads to different problems8). 
It is plausible to assume that in a functioning financial system information 
flows are all the same conducted to key contracting parties. One can therefore 
expect a less developed public disclosure regime, but, as a substitute, a developed 
insider information system. Using the example of the German financial system, 
LEUZ AND WÜSTEMANN [2003] provide institutional and empirical evidence 
supporting both corresponding hypotheses and examine the institutionally 
guaranteed information rights in an insider regime. They show that Germany has 
an elaborated system of legalized and explicit reporting and disclosure duties 
within the firm that disseminates decision-relevant information to key contracting 
parties (but not to the public). The representation of major shareholders and major 
creditors in the supervisory board (and possibly in the audit committee) belongs to 
these private information systems. With respect to banks, German banking 
regulation even obliges any bank which intends granting a credit of more than 
€ 250,000 to have credit-relevant information of the borrowing company disclosed 
by means of annual reports and supplementary information which should include, 
e. g., auditor’s reports (Prüfungsberichte), minutes of balance sheet committee 
meetings (Bilanzgespräche), and prospective budgets (Finanzpläne).9 The type of 
relationship lending typical for the German financial system offers the house bank 
also useful information by means of historical records of actual cash flows of 
borrowers that document credit ratings of the past (e. g., credit transfers and 
paying habits). One could equally add information circulated to labor as a further 
key contracting party: Due to the German system of co-determination, labor is 
also represented in the supervisory board and thereby has access to privileged 
information (see, e.g., FUROBOTN AND RICHTER [1997, pp. 389–404]). As a very 
important information instrument for the members of the supervisory board, the 
German (written) auditor’s report (Prüfungsbericht) gives detailed analytical 
account of the firms financial position, past performance, critical accounting 
                                                 
8  For instance to the problem of “who monitors the monitors” (DIAMOND [1984]; 
ALLEN AND GALE [2001, p. 105]). 
9  See §18 of the Act Regulating Banking and Credit Business (Kreditwesengesetz). 
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policies, and especially shall reveal any dangers of a possible future financial 
distress to the supervisory board (whistle-blowing function).10 
 
 
4   Information Duties and Decision Usefulness 
 
Corporate governance should not only focus on information flows and 
information duties as such but also on the informational contents transmitted. 
Although the decision-usefulness principle forms a major principle (and 
sometimes even overriding principle) for most regulations of corporate financial 
reporting,11 accounting and disclosure rules sometimes give the impression of 
„cookbook accounting”, especially in countries dominated by a case law-
approach. This leads on the one hand to a vast variety of information to investors 
that could confirm the notion of information overflow in securities markets. On 
the other hand, disclosure regimes nevertheless often lack important decision-
relevant information. Comprehensive and comparative discussions of critical 
accounting policies and accounting choices, for instance, should normally enrich 
the accompanying notes of any annual report. A standardized and written report in 
which auditors inform the audit committees of their statutory audit in a legalized 
way could be a form to match the legal demands imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 in the U.S.12 In German annual reports, on the other hand, forward-
looking information and a standardized report comparable to the Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) in Item 303 of regulation S-K would be 
desirable. To avoid information overflow and at the same time improve corporate 
reporting, a consistent system of information duties de lege lata that follows 
informational needs of investors is necessary.13 Standard setting in the area of 
accounting and disclosure by private standard setting bodies which are exposed to 
extreme pressures certainly does not make the necessary reforms easier.  
 
 
5   Information Processing and Behavioral Law and Economics 
 
Since the seminal papers of COASE [1960] and CALABRESI [1961], the Law and 
Economics-approach has become a powerful tool in the analysis of the 
consequences of legal rules and institutions (see, e.g., POSNER [1973/1998], 
COOTER AND ULEN [2000]). It showed that the effects of legal rules and 
institutions can be compared with those of prices. Individual actors respond to 
changes in legal rules, adjusting supply and demand of their intended actions. An 
increase in the penalty for the issuance of misleading statements regarding future 
                                                 
10  See also SUNDER [1997] for a discussion of the role of auditors in the context of 
corporate control. 
11  See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD [2002], INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD [2002], , 4th and 7th European Directives, and §§242, 243, 
and 264 of the German Commerical Code for Germany. See also MOXTER [1966]. 
12  As an example could serve the German auditor’s report. 
13  See MOXTER [2003] for a comprehensive system of German reporting duties de 
lege lata. See for discussion also WÜSTEMANN [2002]. 
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prospects of the firm will thus lower the expected utility of the action and thereby 
reduce the willingness of management to mislead financial markets. However, 
neo-classical Law and Economics is based on rather strong rationality 
assumptions, that from a viewpoint focusing on precisely the effects of rules (and 
less on normative considerations) sometimes lead to false recommendations. As a 
reaction to failures in the predictions made by standard expected utility theory, 
KAHNEMAN AND TVERSKY [1979] introduced insights of psychology and 
sociology to economic analysis. Since then, Behavioral Economics has identified 
a multitude of systematic effects (such as framing, commitment bias, 
overconfidence, hindsight bias, and anchoring) that shape human action but are 
not in conformity with traditional models of utility-maximizing man. 
The approach of Behavioral Law and Economics has applied those insights to 
legal issues.14 The implications of Behavioral Law and Economics for the design 
of disclosure regimes and corporate governance mechanisms are straightforward: 
If information flows need to be evaluated by their addressee and, ultimately, shall 
lead to consequences in their response (decision), then cognitive biases which 
contradict classical assumptions of human behavior need to be taken into account, 
too. This is especially valid regarding substantial business and legal risks. With 
respect to the processing of information to main monitoring parties, evaluation 
and response to risk serves as good example. PAINTER [2003] argues that 
cognitive biases lead to deficiencies in the evaluation of risk and to undesirable 
relating responses. Managers, for instance, who are in a loss frame, will tend to 
take higher risks than they would under normal conditions. Additionally, they will 
not process bad news to the market even though they are obliged to. He concludes 
that in these cases gatekeepers (auditors and lawyers) who are less subject to 
cognitive biases should be committed to report to outside directors (or the 
supervisory board) and that responsibility should be shifted to those parties which 
are not affected by biases. A multitude of corporate governance rules regulating 
auditors and lawyers in the U.S. and E.U. can be explained as strategies to avoid 
cognitive biases in the response to risk. Normatively spoken, cognitive biases 
should be considered with respect to the making of new rules. 
Cognitive biases have also implications for the processing of new information 
to securities markets and in consequence for possible claims of people that are 
legally entitled to have the information sooner than they actually get it and may 
therefore raise claims against the corporation (PAINTER [2003, p. 2]). But 
behavioral research has impacts for the functioning of public disclosure regimes, 
too. If financial markets are at least not generally semi-efficient, as recent research 
in Behavioral Finance (see SHLEIFER [1999] and GLASER, NÖTH, AND WEBER 
[2004]) suggests, then some rules protecting investors—such as the fraud-on-the-
market theory—may lack their theoretical foundation (LANGEVOORT [1992]). 
Short-term inefficiencies of capital markets may also somewhat limit the 
beneficial effects of a market for corporate control and emphasize the need of 
complementary mechanisms of insider control. 
 
                                                 
14  See, e.g., JOLLS, SUNSTEIN, AND THALER [1998]; LANGEVOORT [1998]; 
KOROBKIN AND ULEN [2000]; see for a critical appraisal, e.g., POSNER [1998]. 
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6   Summary 
 
(1) Collapses of large companies in both the bank-oriented and the market-
oriented financial systems reveal deficiencies of corporate governance worldwide 
and lead to legislative proposals in the U.S. and the E.U. 
 
(2) Both the public disclosure regime and information duties towards main 
monitoring parties (including outside directors) seem to be of equal importance 
for successful corporate governance. Research also emphasizes the importance of 
complementary institutions such as class actions, enforcement institutions (like 
the SEC), and the institutional infrastructure. 
 
(3) Regulation of accounting and disclosure, however, sometimes resembles a 
cookbook and needs to be transformed in a more principle-based and deductive 
system of disclosure duties. 
 
(4) Institutional design of corporate governance should be based on realistic 
assumptions of human decision behavior. Here, the role of independent auditors 
and lawyers is of great importance to corporate governance, especially in times of 
corporate crises. 
 
(5) The New Institutional Economics still proves to provide a comprehensive 
analytical framework for positive and normative research issues in corporate 
governance. 
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